the peace treaty. It appears now fairly probable that the democratization of Central Europe, which will be an inevitable consequence of this War, will go further to achieve our war aim *(d)* than any measures we could devise. But, even so, a substantial measure of military success will be necessary for the attainment of our ends (<?) and *(d).* How is this to be achieved ? And this brings me to the consideration of the present strategic and military situation.

2. *Salonika.*

In this connection the dominant fact that emerges is that our scope for military operations has become considerably narrowed down as the War has progressed. Possibilities of offensive action which at earlier stages of the War were open to us are no longer possible and several brilliant ideas will not now be put to the test of trial. On the contrary even our present fields of operation may have to be revised and contracted. The warnings of the First Sea Lord as to the naval and shipping position have become so grave and insistent that it would be dangerous in the extreme to continue to ignore them indefinitely. The question therefore arises, which of our overseas campaigns is the least promising to the attainment of our ends and makes the heaviest demands on our stopping. This undoubtedly is the Salonika campaign, which has

failed in its original intention, and will
Should more and more become not only a
b" abandoned ?milii?y* and naval but
P°ssibly also
a political embarrassment. Apart from
a victorious offensive which may seriously threaten
Sofia I can only see two advantages arising from